He offers three reasons. First, that ever since the revolution of 1959 the island has been a station for the Soviets, then the Russians, and now the Chinese; American authorities, he says, have confirmed a growing Chinese intelligence presence there and close coordination with Russia on military matters. Second, that a great multitude comes from Cuba to the southern border of the United States without lawful entry, burdening the treasury and supplying material for crime. Last, that the island is the standard of those who preach revolution and common property, since he asserts that two-thirds of young Americans now prefer such a commonwealth. He adds that the National Security Strategy published in December 2025 revived the Monroe Doctrine, and that many experts regard the expedition into Venezuela as a success.

Caesar notes this above all: the writer says war is already under discussion, yet names no one, no magistrate, no general, no council, by whom it is being discussed. What is reported, then, is a rumour, not a decision. The figure on the young must also be taken with caution; for a few days earlier Fox News had reported that forty-two per cent of college students prefer that system. So it happens as was once written of the Gauls: "Stirred by such reports and hearsay, they often form plans on the gravest matters, which they must at once regret, since they are slaves to uncertain rumours."

Next he considers the military question. To seize one man in a swift stroke is the work of a few days and a few cohorts; to hold an island is the work of years and of legions. The writer says nothing of ships, of troops, of the harbours where they would land, of supply, of the season, or of who would govern the island after victory. He dismisses the precedents of the old wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq on the single ground that Cuba is neither Iraq nor Afghanistan. That is true; but every island has its own dangers, and they are not removed by leaving them unnamed.

Caesar himself twice crossed to Britain. In the first year the transports carrying his cavalry were driven back by a storm; a tide he did not know wrecked the ships drawn up on the beach; the grain ran short. He saw the island; he did not hold it. In the following year he crossed with a larger fleet, and took with him the Gallic chiefs whose loyalty he doubted, so that Gaul should not rise while the army was away. For the sea endangers a general's rear more than his enemy does.

And the Americans' rear is not secure at present. The midterm elections will be held in a few days; in recent days federal agents searched the home of Representative Ilhan Omar; the Justice Department is contesting the votes with Los Angeles County; Judge Furman has ruled a dismissal by the President unlawful. A man who sends an army across the sea while the factions at home fight each other with lawsuits and prosecutions will, if anything goes wrong, be accused first by his citizens, not by the enemy. Caesar, moreover, will not be surprised if a war fought on the island sends more refugees to Florida than peace does; for those who flee arms do not fear the sea.

Curio in Africa believed reports that Juba was away when he was at hand, and lost his army along with his life, because "men generally believe what they wish to believe." The remedy, then, is not new. First concord must be settled at home; scouts must be sent who will report what is true, not what is welcome; supply and a fleet must be prepared; it must be decided who will govern the island after victory, and by what hostages its loyalty will be held. When these things are done, war may be debated; if not, Fortune, who by small turns brings about great changes, will do the debating. War is easily waged in an op-ed, and hard on the beach.